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Building on the negotiation of U.S. bilateral investment treaties beginning in the
early 1980s, U.S. free trade agreements incorporating specific host-state obligations
to foreign investors and binding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) have been
a feature of U.S. trade and investment policy since 1992 (when the NAFTA
negotiations were concluded). Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W Bush, Bill
Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama have all endorsed ISDS, despite
opposition by many Democratic legislators, organized labor and environmental
groups.
Yet the content of these investment chapters shows a significant evolution from
NAFTA to the Australia- United States FTA ("AUSF7A," without ISDS), the
United States-Chile FTA and the Singapore-United States FTA (2003) to the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (2015). The changes have been driven largely by
the concerns of civil society and government officials over the dozens of NAFTA
investment claims filed against he NAFTA Parties. They also reflect the perceived
need for the United States and other host governments to maintain a higher level of
regulatory flexibility and discretion, particularly in such areas as protecting the
environment and maintaining public health. The United States' Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA) legislation enacted in 2002 and 2015 also mirrors these post-
NAFTA changes. The newest iteration of the mechanism (Chapter 9 of the TPP),
should it eventually enter into force for all or most of the signatories or he
incorporated in other U.S. trade agreements uch as a renegotiated NAFTA, would
thus afford host governments far more regulatory discretion than earlier agreements
such as NAFTA, along with increased transparency, making it more difficult for
foreign investors to prevail against host governments with claims of denial of 'fair
and equitable treatment" and "regulatory takings." The evolution of U.S.
sponsored investment protection provisions into a significantly more host government
friendly, regulatory friendly, process, is the principal theme of this paper.
* Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law, Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona;
Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Fall 2016. This article draws
extensively on a paper written for a conference in Ottawa in September 2015, sponsored by the
Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) in Ontario, "Investor-State Dispute
Settlement in U.S. Law, Politics and Practice: The Debate Continues."
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I. Introduction and Historical Background
The United States was a latecomer to the negotiation and conclusion of
bilateral investment treaties (BIT). While Germany, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and other European nations began concluding BITs twenty
years earlier,' the United States did not sign the first BIT, with Panama,
until 1982,2 with several others signed in 1983 following the completion of
the first U.S. model BIT.3 But, unlike some of the early European BITs,
which did not include investor state dispute settlement (ISDS),4 from the
outset the U.S. BITs incorporated (albeit in considerably different form from
more modem treaties) mandatory third party arbitration mechanisms to
resolve disputes between foreign investors and host countries.s Most U.S.
BITs (some forty-seven) were concluded between 1983 and 2000 by the
Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations.6 Only two, with
Uruguay and Rwanda, have been concluded since 2000.7 The Obama
Administration has concluded none to date but is pursuing a BIT with
China.8
It was not an accident that all U.S. BITs contained ISDS provisions. In
addition to the U.S. Government's desire to afford greater protection for
U.S. investors in developing countries; to encourage needed investment in
the developing world; and to strengthen U.S. views that takings are
governed by international law, a significant driving force behind the United
States' decision to abandon the formal or informal espousal process that had
been followed in recent years, particularly in Latin America in the 1970s.
1. For example, the first German BIT was concluded with Greece in 1961, with other early
BITs concluded in 1962 (Guinea), 1963 (Ceylon), 1964 (Ethiopia) and 1965 (Ecuador). See
UNCTAD INVESTMENT Hus: GERMANY, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Coun
tryBits/78#iialnnerMenu (last visited May 8, 2015). The Netherlands concluded agreements
with Cameroon and the Ivory Coast in 1965. See UNCTAD INvESMErr HUB:
NETHERLANDs, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/148#iialnnerMenu.
2. U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/
117402.htm [hereinafter "US BITS"].
3. See K Scott Gudgeon, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on their Origin, Purposes,
and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 105, 106 (1986) (discussing the
development of the model BI.
4. See e.g., Treaty for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Ceylon,
Nov. 8, 1962 (since terminated), available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1419.
5. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investment, Pan. - U.S., art.
VII(2), Oct. 27, 1982, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43582.pdf
(providing for arbitration under the previously agreed arbitral procedures, before the Inter-
American Arbitration Commission or other international arbitration mechanisms).
6. US BITS, supra note 2.
7. Id.
8. Toward a US-China Investment Treaty, PETERSEN INSTITUTE FOR IN'L EcoN., at 3 (Feb.
2015), http://www.iie.com/publications/briefings/piiebl5-1.pdf [hereinafter "Petersen-China
BIT"]; David A. Gantz, Challenges for the U.S. in Negotiating a Bit with China: Reconciling
Reciprocal Investment Protection with Policy Concerns, 31 ARiZONA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 204
(2014) [hereinafter "Gantz-China BIT"].
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The objective was to make available a third party process that would allow
the United States to avoid espousal in most circumstances. It was thought
that such a process would remove investment disputes from the forefront of
bilateral and regional relations (and significant inter-agency disputes),9 as
with Peru and other members of the Organization of American States during
the 1968 to 1976 period.1o
U.S. Government support of ISDS in free trade agreements (or in BITs
with some FTA parties) has been consistent despite extensive public and
Congressional opposition beginning with the negotiation and conclusion of
NAFTA"1 by the George H.W. Bush Administration.12 The policy has been
consistent despite the fact that there is little hard evidence that BITs, as
distinct from other factors creating a favorable investment climate,
encourage foreign investment. The Clinton Administration negotiated only
one FTA, with Jordan, and it contained no investment provisions because of
a recent separate BIT between the United States and Jordan.13 The George
W. Bush Administration, however, proceeded to negotiate more than a
dozen FTAs, covering seventeen countries, which with one exception
(Australia)14 contain investment chapters with ISDS, obligations except for
those FTAs with countries (e.g., Bahrain) with pre-existing BITs.'s The
Obama Administration's one and only FTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership
9. See KENNETH A. RODMAN, SANCTYTY VS. SOvEREIGNTY: THE U.S. AND THE
NATIONALIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCE INVESTMENTs 45-51 (1988) (relating the strong
disagreements between the State Department and Treasury Department as to how best to deal
with Latin American expropriations).
10. See infra Part II.
11. The earlier United States - Israel free trade agreement and the now-superseded United
States - Canada free trade agreement contain no ISDS provisions. See Agreement on the
Establishment of a Free Trade Area between the Gov't of Isr. and the Gov't of the U.S. of Am.,
Isr. - U.S., Aug. 19, 1985, available at http://tc.export.gov/trade-agreements/alltrade-agree
ments/exp_005439.asp; U.S. - Can. free trade agreement, Can. - U.S., Jan. 2, 1988, available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/cusfta-e
.pdf.
12. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993), available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-
Trade-Agreement [hereinafter "NAFTA"].
13. The 1985 FTA with Israel, negotiated by the Reagan Administration, contains no
investment provisions and no BIT exists between the United States and Israel. See Agreement
on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Jordan-U.S., Oct. 24, 2000, available at https://ustr
.gov/sites/default/files/Jordan%20FTA.pdf.
14. Chapter 11 of the FTA provides the usual investor protections but ISDS is absent other
than with regard to a right of either Party to request consultations on ISDS (art. 11.16). No
public information suggests that such consultations have occurred, although the TPP could
presumably supersede the investment provisions of the bilateral FTA in the event that Australia
consents. See United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset-upload-file
4 28_5167
.pdf (hereinafter "AUSFTA"). See also Free Trade Agreements, USTR, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements.
15. U.S. BITs, supra note 2; See U.S.-Babrain Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., Sep. 14, 2004,
available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/bahrain-fta/final-text.
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(TPP) includes ISDS provisions applicable to all Parties including Australia,
albeit with some exceptions.16
U.S. BITs for the most part have not been particularly controversial,
presumably in large part because a) all to date have been concluded with
developing nations, mostly small ones, or the nations of Eastern Europe
which at the time were developing or emerging market nations; b) the
obligations, including ISDS, are reciprocal but the likelihood of, for
example, a Uruguayan enterprise demanding arbitration of a claim against
the United States Government, is small; and c) BITs are concluded as
treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the senators present and
voting.17 As the provisions of U.S. BITs are considered either self-executing
or enforceable through existing legislation,'s the House of Representatives
typically has no direct role in their approval. Controversy has arisen
primarily during the negotiation (or revision) of model BITs in 2004 and
2012, where the disagreement between business interests on one side and
organized labor and environmentalists on the other has been predictable,
and well after the first of the NAFTA Chapter 11 actions against the United
States had made headlines and empowered opponents of ISDS who feared,
inter alia, interference with regulatory actions.
Still, the most significant debates have been in the context of the Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation enacted in 2002 and re-enacted after
an eight year hiatus in 2015. The possible conclusion of BIT negotiations
between the United States in China, underway for more than five years but
with the negotiations progressing only recently,'9 will likely raise the ISDS
controversy to a previously unknown level if and when a BIT text is
concluded and made public. Significantly, the defenders of ISDS,
principally the U.S. Government and the U.S. business community, have
focused more extensively on the many modifications to the NAFTA model
incorporated in all U.S. FTAs and BITs concluded since 2003, while most of
the opponents largely ignore the changes, directing their opposition instead
16. Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 9.20, Feb. 4, 2016 (not in force), available at https://ustr
.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf [hereinafter "TPP Text"].
17. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.")
18. Investment Treaty with Rwanda (Treaty Doc. 110-23), S. Exec. Rep. No. 111-8, at Ch. VI
(B) (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111erpt8/html/CRPT-11lerpt8
.htm [hereinafter "Rwanda BIT"]. (The investor obligations are considered self-executing,
while obligations such as the obligation of the United States Government to pay an award
against the government would be enforceable under "Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (TIAS 6697) and related provisions of the Federal
Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.), as well as the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (TIAS 6090) and related
provisions of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 1966 (22 U.S.C.
Sec. 1650a).").
19. See Gantz-China BIT, supra note 8.
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toward the perceived undesirability of ISDS (and protection of U.S.
investments abroad) more generally.
This paper is structured as follows: Part II discusses the NAFTA chapter
11 as a reflection of 1980s and early 1990s BITs, and practical experience
under NAFTA and concerns raised among civil society and government
officials. Part m considers the 2002 TPA and 2003 Australia, Chile, and
Singapore FTAs, the first post-NAFTA investment chapters to reflect a new
approach to protecting foreign investment in FTAs, and briefly notes the
changes in the later Bush Administration FTAs. Part IV considers other
more recent developments relating to U.S. policy on investment in FTAs
and BITS. Part V discusses the 2015 TPA, while Part VI summarizes the
further refinements embodied in Chapter 9 of the TPP (many of which
reflect the more recent United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement
(KORUS)).20 The final Part VII speculates on how the revised features of
TPP may affect ISDS among the twelve TPP Parties (assuming of course
that the TPP eventually enters into force).
II. NAFTA's Investment Provisions and Experience Under
Chapter 11
A. NAFTA's PRECURSORS
NAFTA Chapter 11 is based on U.S. BITs negotiated earlier, and on the
model BIT completed in 1984. It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss BIT provisions in extensive detail.21 Rather, the analysis is focused
on the inclusion of ISDS and related BIT and investment chapter provisions
in such areas as fair and equitable treatment, expropriation and transparency.
Critically, U.S. BITs and investment chapters have permitted individual
foreign investors to bring actions against foreign government that were
party to the agreements, without any requirement of approval or
participation by the investor's home government.
Among the innovations of the 1984 U.S. model BIT (first announced in
1982 but later modified) and the many agreements negotiated using the
model as the basis for negotiations, was the inclusion of ISDS, which had
already been made part of many of the BITs concluded by European nations.
As one commentator noted,
The treaties are genuinely new in this regard. While the assumption of
continuing amicable relations between the protected investor and the
host State is implicit in the BITs, the treaties guarantee investors access
to a neutral arbitral forum in which to present any claims. To this end,
the signatories consent to international arbitral jurisdiction in the BITs,
20. U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 2007, available at https://ustr
.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [hereinafter "KORUS"].
21. See e.g. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TIU TIEs (2nd ed. 2015).
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and the treaties establish mechanisms to ensure that arbitration may
proceed even if the host State refused to cooperate.22
That being said, the ISDS provisions in the early U.S. treaties, and in the
1984 model BIT, were less explicit than in later agreements, although
perhaps equally effective in requiring binding arbitration upon the demand
of the foreign investor. In particular, where consultation and negotiation
between the investor and the host government failed, arbitration was
mandatory, requiring that "the dispute shall be submitted for settlement in
accordance with previously agreed, applicable dispute-settlement
procedures."23 Still, such "previously agreed" procedures are to a great
extent incorporated in the 1984 model BIT language, which provides that
each (government) Party consents to submission of such disputes to binding
arbitration at ICSID or, where the Centre is not available because the host
government is not a party to ICSID, to the ICSID Additional Facility.24
Including Chapter 11 in NAFTA was thus not a radical move for the
United States. The sources were the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (for the obligations to the investor), various U.S. BITs, and the
1992 "model" BIT (for ISDS).25 The inclusion in NAFTA of international
law standards for the treatment of foreign investment along with a
compulsory third-party arbitration procedure to settle investment disputes
is, rightly, viewed as a major achievement for the Departments of State,
Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Representative's Office (USTR) as well as the
U.S. business community, considering that it overcame many decades of
Mexico's adherence to the Calvo Clause26 and a long and troubled history of
22. Wayne Sachs, The New U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 192, 219
(1984).
23. Text of the U.S. Model Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment of February 24, 1984, 4 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 136, 140 art. VI(2) (1986).
24. Id. at art. VI(3).
25. Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy Ell, Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter:
Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMETr: A NEw FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE
AMEICAS 167, n. 6 (Judith H. Bello et al., eds. 1994).
26. The Calvo Clause, named after the Argentine jurist, Carlos Calvo, who articulated it first,
posits that investors in the nation must agree to resolve disputes in the local courts and to
forego seeking diplomatic protection by the home state in the event of difficulties. Article 27 of
the Mexico Constitution reads:
Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right to
acquire ownership of lands, waters and their appurtenances, or to obtain
concessions for the exploitation of mines or of waters. The State may grant the same
right to foreigners, provided they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider
themselves as nationals in respect to such property, and bind themselves not to invoke the
protection of their governments in matters relating thereto; under penalty, in case of
noncompliance with this agreement, of forfeiture of the property acquired to the Nation.
Constituti6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Political Constitution of the United
Mexican States] [C.P.], art. 27., Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], 55 de Febrero de 1919
(Mex.). (Emphasis added.)
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investment disputes between Mexico the United States, including the
petroleum industry expropriation in 1938.27 What was radical was the
inclusion for the first time of ISDS in an agreement with another developed
nation (Canada).
B. THE NAFTA EXPERIENCE
Over twenty-two years NAFTA has generated more than 50 ISDS claims.
Of the seventeen against the United States only seven have reached the
award stage, and the United States has yet to be required to pay an award to
a foreign claimant.28 Still, the majority of the claims, some thirty-five
(including notices of arbitration for cases that were never pursued), have
been filed and in many instances litigated, not against Mexico but between
two developed nations, investors of the United States against Canada, and
vice versa.29 (In contrast, as far as the author has been able to determine,
only one case has been brought by a foreign investor under any BIT or any
other ETA investment chapter against the United States, and in three years
the latter proceeding, under CAFTA-DR, has not progressed beyond the
"notice of intent to arbitrate" stage.)30 Also, only one case has been brought
by a Canadian investor against Mexico.31
The most frequently articulated government and NGO (and some state
government) concerns have centered on the preservation of government
authority to regulate without facing liability for such actions as regulations
to preserve the environment or to support public health and safety. They
also relate to the allegations that foreign investors in the United States have
greater rights to compensation than U.S. citizens under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Because literature elsewhere extensively analyzes the NAFTA and post-
NAFTA changes in investment chapters,32 this discussion is restricted to the
highlights in terms of changes in provisions relating to fair and equitable
treatment, expropriation, transparency in the arbitral proceedings and
27. RODMAN, supra note 9, at 110-22.
28. See Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state
.gov/s/1/c3740.htm, for cases against Canada; see Cases Filed Against the United States ofAmerica,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm, for cases against the U.S.
29. See id.
30. Id.; A total of eight ISDS claims have been filed by U.S. nationals and/or corporations
against Costa Rica (1), the Dominican Republic (3), Guatemala (2) and El Salvador (2).
Guatemalan, Costa Rican and Dominican Claimants (Stanford Ponzi Scheme) v. United States,
Dec. 31, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c56919.htm (based on the alleged failure of
U.S. regulators to exercise the international standard of due diligence to stop the Stanford
Ponzi scheme and thus protect the claimant investors against fraud).
31. Cases Filed Against the United Mexican States, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/
s/1/c3742.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
32. See e.g., PRICE & CHIUsTY, supra note 25; David A. Gantz, Settlement of Disputes under the
Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, 30 BOSTON COLLEGE
INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 331 (2007).
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various procedural issues designed to eliminate frivolous claims from the
outset, particularly as reflected in the AUSFTA and TTP.
Judging from the cases litigated under NAFTA and the attacks on Chapter
11, the most significant and controversial investors' protections in Chapter
11, Section A, are the rights to national treatment under Article 1102,33 "fair
and equitable treatment" under Article 1105,34 and fair compensation in the
event of expropriation or nationalization, direct or indirect, under Article
1110.35 (Many cases have turned on national treatment and non-
discrimination under Article 1102 but the application of the requirement has
been more straight-forward despite some issues of interpretation, and the
national treatment language in subsequent agreements does not vary
materially from NAIFTA.)36 Tribunals established under Chapter 11 "decide
the issues in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of
international law."37
As with other FTAs and BITs, NAFTA, Chapter 11, Section B, provides a
detailed mechanism designed to facilitate binding resolution of investment
disputes through compulsory arbitration,38 normally through the World
Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) "Additional Facility"39 or under the arbitral rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The
ICSID Additional Facility is available if only one, the host state or the
investor's home state, is a Party to the Convention.40 These mechanisms are
not mandatory for the foreign investor who may elect to submit disputes to
33. "1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than it
accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale of or other disposition of
investments." NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1102.
34. "1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection
and security." Id., art. 1105.
35. "1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a
non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d)
on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6 [fair market value]."
Id., art. 1110.
36. See e.g., Lucy REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLAcKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID
ARBITRATION 83 (2nd ed., Kluwer Law 2010).
37. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1131 § 1.
38. Id., art. 1120, 1122.
39. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, available at https://treaties
.un.org/doc/Publication/ UNTS /Volume%20575 /volume-575-I-83 59-English.pdf; ICSID
Additional Facility Rules, art. 2 (1), Apr. 2006, available at http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
icsid/staticfiles/facility/partd-chap02.htm.
40. Mexico is not a party to ICSID and Canada became a party only in 2013; ICSCID proper
was thus not available under Chapter 11 prior to 2013.
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the local courts.41 NAFTA provisions include the essential elements of the
ISDS process, such as the investor's choice of arbitration before ICSID, the
ICSID additional facility or under UNCITRAL Rules; the three year statute
of limitations; and the "choice in the road" between national court litigation
and international arbitration, which have not changed markedly in U.S.
FTAs since NAFTA.42
Among the possible constraints on arbitrators, the NAFTA Parties
reserved the right to issue interpretations of the provisions of the agreement,
with the proviso that "[a]n interpretation by the Commission of a provision
of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this
Section."43 One limitation in NAFTA that was changed in 2003 in the
Singapore FTA, is reflected in the fact that NAFTA's ISDS provisions make
no specific mention of investment authorizations or investment agreements,
contracts with the governments as, for example, for government
procurement (excluded from coverage under Article 1108), although ISDS
jurisdiction exists over monopolies and state enterprises where "the
monopoly has acted in a manner inconsistent with the Party's obligations
under Section A [the investor protections] and that the investor has incurred
loss or damage by reason, or rising out of, that breach."4
In addition to the key provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11, additional
concerns surfaced over the lack of transparency in "secret" ISDS
proceedings and concerns that foreign investors through NAFTA and
subsequent agreements had acquired greater rights than U.S. investors
under the U.S. Constitution, both as discussed below, as well as worries that
arbitral tribunal would join procedural issues with the substance of the
claims, resulting in a prolongation of the process (and the costs associated
therewith) even where the claim is ultimately dismissed.
Explicit opposition to Chapter 11 did not spread until after the first
Chapter 11 case was filed by the Ethyl Corporation, in April 1997.4s The
process was publicly attacked by a prominent anti-trade NGO, Public
Citizen:
Ethyl Corporation's $251 million lawsuit against a new Canadian
environmental law should set off alarm bells throughout the public
interest world. The suit, brought under the terms of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, demonstrates the serious danger that
41. If the investor decides to bring a NAFTA claim for damages based on a NAFTA
government's measure or measures, the investor must waive her right to initiate or continue a
parallel action in a national administrative tribunal or court, except for certain injunctive relief.
NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1121 § 1(b).
42. Id., arts. 1116. § 2, 1120, 1121.
43. Id., art. 1131 § 2.
44. See id., art. 1116 § 2.
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present and future international economic pacts could pose to
environmental regulations and other laws that protect the public.-
While Ethyl was settled in the aftermath of a finding adverse to the
Canadian government by a Canadian federal-provincial dispute settlement
arbitration panel,47 the controversy generated and the concerns of opponents
were on-going, particularly with regard to the Methanex and Loewen cases
against the United States (discussed infra) and the Pope and Talbot and S.D.
Myers cases against Canada.
The ensuing NAFTA-based litigation changed many views. As one then
senior U.S. State Department official, Mark Clodfelter, commented seven
years after NAFTA entered into force, the United States Government, and
for that matter Canada and Mexico,
took a very big step into the unknown when they signed onto Chapter
11. The NAFTA Parties have waived sovereign immunity from claims
to an extent far greater than they have consented to the jurisdiction, for
example, of the International Court of Justice. They have agreed to be
answerable to private claimants before arbitral tribunals that are subject
to only very limited review. Even though the United States has been
party to a fair number of BITs, which have arrangements resembling
Chapter 11, we have never done so with states that has so much
investment in our territory.48
This was radical, because the United States had never concluded a BIT in
the past with another developed country, although that aspect of the
coverage of Chapter 11 does not appear to have received much U.S.
government attention until well after the fact, when thoughtful officials such
as Mr. Clodfelter commented on it.49
The cases against the United States have inevitably involved not only the
State Department and USTR, but also domestic agencies such as the
Department of Justice and the Environmental Protection Agency (the latter
particularly for the Methanex claim that raised environmental issues arising
46. Michelle Sforza & Mark Vallianatos, Ethyl Corporation vs. Government of Canada: "Now
Investors Can Use NAFTA to Challenge Environmental Safeguards", Pus. CrrIzEN 1998, http://
www.citizen.org/trade/articleredirect.cfm?ID=622 1.
47. See NAFTA - Chapter 11 - Investment, Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada, Ethyl
Corporation v. the Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFFARS CAN., http://www.international.gc.cal
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/ethyl.aspx?lang=eng.
48. Mark Clodfelter, U.S. State Department Participation in International Economic Dispute
Resolution, 42 S. TEx. L. REv. 1273, 1283 (2001). Mr. Clodfelter was the Assistant Legal
Adviser of the Office of International Claims and Investment Disputes.
49. The State Department's guidance on the U.S. BIT program a few years ago listed as one
of the "basic aims" to "[p]rotect investment abroad in those countries where investors' rights are
not already protected through existing agreements . . . ." Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF
THE UNrrED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-
investment-treaties (last visited Jan. 14, 2017). The guidance says nothing about reciprocal
actions by foreign investors against the United States. See id.
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out of California's banning of a gasoline additive for environmental--or
perhaps political-reasons). This created a potential for conflict between on
the one hand national agencies that are principally concerned with
encouraging U.S. investment abroad and foreign trade (State and USTR)
and, on the other hand, those that are more concerned with defending
federal government and state actions5o allegedly inconsistent with Chapter
11, such as the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation,
the Department of the Interior or the Environmental Protection Agency.
Most of the controversies that have led to at least some reevaluation of
U.S. government support of investment disputes fall into one of several
areas. First, there are differences arising from conflicts between trade and
"legitimate" government regulatory action, including but not limited to
actions protecting the environment. This is particularly true with regard to
the expropriation provision, Article 1110. Second, concerns exist, primarily
among non-governmental organizations and some Members of Congress,
regarding the appropriateness of having NAFTA tribunals effectively review
decisions of U.S. state and federal courts. Third, there exists an articulated
concern, albeit probably unjustified, by the same NGOs and their supporters
in Congress that foreign citizens may have achieved greater substantive
rights regarding investment in U.S. territory under NAFTA than do
American citizens under the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.5 Fourth, broad dissatisfaction is expressed over the lack
of transparency of the arbitral process, whereby under the original NAIFTA
Chapter 11 (before modifications in 2001 and 2003), the proceedings,
including the pleadings and hearings, were conducted largely in secret.
The Methanex case52 aptly illustrates the concerns by the NAFTA
governments and civil society over "regulatory takings" that could require
compensation. The Canadian firm Methanex challenged the action of the
State of California in banning the gasoline additive methyl tert-butyl ether
(MTBE) because of the perceived risk that it might pollute the underground
water supply. These measures were characterized by the claimant both
directly and indirectly as "tantamount to expropriation." The arbitral
tribunal did not ultimately reach the question of whether California's action
constituted a compensable taking under Article 1110. Rather, it determined
that the connection between the California MTBE ban and Methanex'
operations was not "legally significant" so as to satisfy the "relating to"
language in NAFTA, Article 1101. (Methanex manufactured methanol, the
primary component of MTBE, not MTBE itself.) Ultimately, the tribunal
dismissed all claims by Methanex against the United States on the merits,
50. Under Article 105 of NAFTA, state and local governments are bound by NAFTA
provisions, unless otherwise provided. NAFTA, supra note 12.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
52. Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005).
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rejecting as well Methanex's claims of violations of national treatment and
fair and equitable treatment.53
Anti-NAFTA groups in the United States had also seized on Loewen as "an
all-out attack on democracy. If successful, it would undermine the jury
system, which is fundamental to our system of justice."54 In Loewen, a
Louisiana state court trial, conducted in with obvious prejudice to the
Canadian investor, rendered a state anti-trust verdict against Loewen (a
Canadian operator of funeral homes in Louisiana). The jury found a few
million dollars worth of actual damages, plus approximately $400 million in
punitive damages.55 Because the claimant apparently could not meet
bonding requirements for an appeal, set at $625 million under Louisiana
law, Loewen settled the case for $175 million "under conditions of extreme
duress." Eventually it brought a Chapter 11 claim against the United States.
Among Loewen's contentions was that actions of the Louisiana trial court,
the excessive monetary judgment and the bonding requirements amounted
to a denial of justice and of fair and equitable treatment by the Louisiana
courts in violation of NAFTA, Article 1105 and of customary international
law. The arbitral proceedings were initially dismissed on procedural
grounds, with the Tribunal holding that availability of the Chapter 11
mechanism had been lost when Loewen, in bankruptcy, transferred its
interests to a U.S. firm. In extensive dicta, the Tribunal analyzed the
Louisiana state court proceedings at considerable length, characterizing
them as a "disgrace." But the tribunal nevertheless concluded in further
dicta that the decision was not cognizable under NAFTA and international
law because Loewen had not received a final court verdict within the United
States court system, and there had thus not been a denial of justice (in
addition to the loss of Canadian nationality of the corporate claimant).
A subsequent ruling by the arbitral tribunal, after Raymond Loewen, one
of the individual claimants, asserted his continuous Canadian citizenship,
necessarily resulted in a decision on the merits, converting the earlier dictum
into a holding that the action of the Mississippi court did not meet the
international law threshold of a denial of justice for lack of exhaustion of
national judicial remedies by the Claimants.
A few years later, evidence surfaced that one of the arbitrators in Loewen,
former Congressman and U.S. appellate court judge Abner Mikva, had been
improperly influenced by the U.S. Department of Justice while serving on
53. See Howard Mann, The Final Decision in Methanex v. United States: Some New Wine in New
Bottles, INT'L INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Aug. 2005), http://www.iisd.org/
pdf/2005/commentary-methanex.pdf.
54. David A. Gantz, The United States and Dispute Settlement under the North American Free
Trade Agreement: Ambivalence, Frustration, and Occasional Defiance in THE SwoRD AND THE
SCALES: THE UNrrED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 356, 370
(Cesare P.R. Romano ed., 1999).
55. Among other things, Loewen alleged that the court permitted repeated appeals to the
jury's anti-Canadian, racial and class biases. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 42 I.L.M.
811, 812-16 (2003).
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the tribunal. As Judge Mikva related the incident at a conference in 2004, a
Justice Department official had said to Mikva, "You know judge, if we lose
this case we could lose NAFTA." Mikva recounted his answer as, "Well, if
you want to put pressure on me, then that does it."s6 This remarkable
exchange confirms the extraordinary level of concern felt by U.S.
government officials when the United States was a respondent in
controversial ISDS proceedings (and may explain a puzzling, pro-U.S.
Government result in a case which many observers expected to be won by
Loewen).
Of course, whether the regulatory actions such as those challenged in
Methanex and attacks on state court decisions, as in Loewen, are "valid" is to
be determined by the adjudicatory process. But the mere possibility that
they might do so was enough to lead the American private sector and U.S.
government to the barricades. For example, environmental groups have
been highly critical of the repeated use of investor protection provisions "to
challenge the host country's environmental laws and administrative
decisions," noting that, "the provisions designed to ensure security and
predictability for the investors have created uncertainty and unpredictability
for environmental regulators."57 Similarly, one American official suggested
that "[the] promise [of NAFTA as a model for the FTAA and other
agreements] ... will only be fulfilled if Chapter 11 tribunals are successful in
distinguishing valid claims under NAFTA and international law from claims
beyond the bounds of what the Parties believed they were agreeing to when
they entered into the NAFTA."8
Certain changes in ISDS procedures that arguably did not require
amendment of NAFTA were made by the NAFTA Parties in response to
public criticism of the process. In July 2001, the Parties issued an
"interpretation" as permitted under Chapter 11, declaring that NAFTA did
not require the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings and pledging with a
few exceptions to make all arbitral documents "available to the public in a
timely manner."S9 (Business confidential information and privileged
governmental information were to remain confidential, in both pleadings
and hearings.) Fully two years later, after the enactment of TPA in 2002
(discussed below), the United States and Canada stated that they would
56. See Jan Paulsson, Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair, University of Miami Law
School, Inaugural Lecture: Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution (Apr. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12773749999020/paulsson-moralhazard
.pdf.
57. Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, NAF7A's Chapter 11 and the Environment, Iwr'L
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1999), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf (last
visited June 10, 2015).
58. Clodfelter, supra note 48, at 1283.
59. Free Trade Comnission, Notice of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31,
2001, para. A(1-2), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11 under
standing-e.asp [hereinafter "NAFTA Interpretation"].
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consent to opening hearings in Chapter 11 disputes.60 Such transparency
provisions have been included with minor variations in all subsequent BITs
and FTA investment provisions negotiated by the United States. Procedures
were also initiated to permit amicus curiae briefs, first accepted by a NAFTA
tribunal in 2003.61 Each of the NAFTA governments maintains a website
where documents can be found.62
The NAFTA Parties also attempted in the Interpretation to limit the
scope of the "minimum standard of treatment" under Article 1105 by
emphasizing inter alia that "[t]he concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment'
and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or
beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens."63 (This was designed to deal in part with
the apparently inadvertent omission of "customary" before "international
law" in Article 1105.) This Interpretation language has also been included in
subsequent U.S. FTAs and BITs as discussed below.
III. 2002 Trade Promotion Authority, U.S.-Australia FTA, U.S.-
Chile FTA and the U.S.-Singapore IFTA
The various pressures on the George W. Bush Administration and
Congress to introduce changes led to new negotiating instructions in the
President's TPA for 2002, legislation which was effectively necessary for the
President and his U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to undertake
their ambitious plans for regional trade agreements. Without limiting
Congress to up or down votes (preventing Congress from amending the
texts after the fact to favor U.S. interests) and without requiring specific time
limits for Congressional consideration, other countries simply have not been
willing to give their last, best positions during the FTA negotiations.- The
statutory negotiating objectives in TPA, one of the benefits for Congress in
60. U.S. Dep't of State, Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations
(Oct. 7, 2003), https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/TradeAgreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset-up
loadfilel43_3602.pdf (last visited May 21, 2015).
61. See Don McCrae, Amicus Curiae Submissions to the NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal: Methanex
Corp. v. United States ofAmerica, INT'L INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Mar. 12,
2004), https://www.iisd.org/publications/amicus-curiae-submissions-nafta-chapter-11-tribunal-
methanex-corp-v-united-states (discussing the IISD amicus submission).
62. See NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/s/l/
c3439.htm; See also NAFTA - Chapter 11 - Investment: Cases Filed Against the Government of
Canada, GLOBAL AFFARS CAN., http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-com
merciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng.
63. NAFTA Interpretation, supra note 59, para. 1.2.
64. See S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 107 (1974) ("Our negotiators cannot be expected to
accomplish the negotiating goals of Title I if there are no reasonable assurances that the
negotiated agreements would be voted up-or-down on their merits. Our trading partners have
expressed an unwillingness to negotiate without some assurances that the Congress will
consider the agreements within a definite time-frame."); see also Ian. F. Fergusson, Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE 1, 4 (une 15, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33743.pdf.
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the TPA compromise, thus become critical since if they are not followed,
Congress may well refuse to approve the resulting agreement (although to
date this has not occurred under TPA). As the Congressional Research
Service describes the situation with TPA,
To take the fullest advantage of these benefits, Congress, drawing on its
constitutional authority and historical precedent, defined the objectives
that the President is to pursue in trade negotiations. Although the
executive branch has some discretion over implementing these goals,
they are definitive statements of U.S. trade policy that the
Administration is expected to honor if it expects trade agreement
implementing legislation to be considered under expedited rules. For
this reason, trade negotiating objectives stand at the center of the
congressional debate on TPA.65
In the debate the pro-investment protection contingent of business and
government have generally prevailed on the basic principles needed to
protect American investors abroad, although groups advocating the
inclusion of strong labor rights and environmental provisions also succeeded
to the extent of having them included in TPA,66 albeit without the right to
bring labor and environmental actions directly against Parties to the
agreements. Still, beginning with the 2002 TPA, the investment protection
pendulum has swung to a very significant degree toward host governments
and away from unfettered investor rights. With regard to investment, many
major changes from the NAFTA approach were ultimately adopted. These
included inter alia provisions related to minimum standard of treatment;
expropriation, particularly indirect expropriation; transparency, including
amicus briefs; procedures to deal with frivolous claims; and provision for an
appellate mechanism to review arbitral decisions.67
Predictably, these changes did not satisfy the opponents of FTAs or ISDS.
As Public Citizen argued when President George W. Bush proposed to
include ISDS in TPA, "this extraordinary mechanism empowers private
investors and corporations to sue NAFTA-signatory governments in special
tribunals to obtain cash compensation for government policies or actions
that investors believe violate their new rights under NAFTA." Further, such
investor protections, claimed to be necessary to protect investors from
expropriation, instead permit investors to "challenge environmental laws,
regulations and government decisions at the state and local level . . . ."68 It is
65. Fergusson, supra note 64, at 11 (emphasis added).
66. See Fergusson, supra note 64, at 7 (The 2002 TPA did not, however, mandate the inclusion
of minimal enforceable labor standards, a deficiency that was remedied only with the Bipartisan
Trade Deal in 2007, as discussed below.).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2002); see also Trade Act of 2002, Conference Report, Jul. 26,
2002, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., Report 107-624, at 151, 156.
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significant that despite the changes TPA passed in late 2002 with only a one
vote majority in the House of Representatives.69
Following the enactment of 2002 TPA, in the AUSFTA an annex was
included (which also appears as an annex in the Chile FTA and as an
exchange of letters in the United States - Singapore Free Trade Agreement),
designed to restrict significantly and legally the scope of the "indirect"
expropriation provisions as they may apply to government regulatory
activities.70
The focus was on protecting "legitimate" government regulatory actions
from being treated as compensable indirect expropriations, in part through
incorporating U.S. takings law, reflecting the TPA language that foreign
investors not be "accorded greater substantive rights with respect to
investment protections than United States investors in the United States."
Thus, subparagraphs 4 (a) (i) to (iii) were based on Penn Central, a U.S.
Supreme Court case involving an unsuccessful action against New York City
claiming that restricting air rights above the terminal (where the claimant
had wanted to build a skyscraper) was not a compensable taking in part
because it did not deprive Penn Central of reasonable economic use of its
property.71 The negotiators presumably looked as well at other Supreme
Court precedents, such as Lucas, where the Court found a compensable
69. See H.R. 3005 (107th): Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, GovTRACK, https:/
/www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/hr3005.
70. Stating:
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that Article 1.7.1 [expropriation] is
intended to reflect customary international law concerning the obligation of States
with respect to expropriation. 2. An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot
constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property
right or property interest in an investment. 3. Article 11.7.1 addresses two
situations. The first is direct expropriation, where an investment is nationalized or
otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
4. The second situation addressed by Article 11.7.1 is indirect expropriation, where
an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct
expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure. (a) The
determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact
situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based
inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i) the economic impact of the
government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party
has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does
not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the
government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed
expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action. (b) Except in rare
circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.
AUSFTA, supra note 14, Annex 11-B. See also United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement,
Annex 10-D, Jan. 1, 2004, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
chile-fta/final-text [hereinafter "U.S.-Chile FTA"].
71. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
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taking when the government action deprived the claimant of all
economically viable use of his land.72
The "except in rare circumstances" language was apparently intended to
be a clear statement, also reflecting U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, that
in the absence of discrimination a presumption exists that the listed
regulatory actions will not be treated as compensable expropriations by
arbitral tribunals. This language also reflects the requirement in the 2002
TPA that foreign investors not be accorded greater substantive rights than
U.S. citizens litigating in U.S. courts.73 The assumption appears to have
been that for many other countries, including Canada (which has no
constitutionally mandated Fourth Amendment equivalent to protect private
property), the protection offered by investment agreements in fact does
provide broader substantive rights than local law and constitutions,
particularly in nations where the rule of law is weak. The concept of
"reasonable investment-backed expectations" also remains. Similarly, the
troublesome concept of fair and equitable treatment received additional
language in the Chile FTA (but not the AUSFTA) and in subsequent U.S.
ETA investment chapters to define and limit its scope to the narrow standard
of customary international law.74
The Singapore and similar FTAs, including the AUSETA, also included a
side letter or annex clarifying: "the Parties' shared understanding that
customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
States that they follow from a sense of legal obligations. With regard to
Article 15.5 (Minimum Standard of Treatment), the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all customary
72. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032-33 (1992).
73. See Parvan P. Parvanov & Mark Kantor, Comparing U.S. Law and Recent U.S. Investment
Agreements, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTmENT LAW & POLICY 2010-2011 741,
779 (Karl. P. Sauvant, ed., 2011).
74. Stating, in part:
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to,
be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment"
and "full protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond
that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive
rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide: (a) "fair and equitable treatment"
includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative
adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied
in the principal legal systems of the world; and (b) "full protection and security"
requires each Party to provide the level of police protection required under
customary international law.
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 15.5, May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
1026 (2003) [hereinafter "Singapore FTA"].
But Cf United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, supra note 70, art. 10.4.2.
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international law principles that protected the economic rights and interests
of aliens."7s
The Singapore and Chile FTAs and CAFTA-DR include treaty language
on transparency similar to that included in the NAFTA Interpretation and
follow-up statement, as reflected in the 2002 TPA negotiating objectives,
providing for transparency of arbitral proceedings, including open hearings,
publication on the Internet of all pleadings not containing business
confidential or privileged information.76 The Singapore FTA also provides
that "[w]ithout prejudice to a tribunal's authority to address other objections
as a preliminary question, a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary
question any objection by the respondent hat, as a matter of law, a claim
submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may be
made," in an attempt (likely reflecting the lengthy Methanex proceedings) to
convince arbitral tribunals to resolve procedural issues at the outset.77 Both
the Singapore and Chile FTAs also include new language in the ISDS
provisions that explicitly covers investment authorizations and investment
agreements.78 Such language has been consistently included in subsequent
U.S. FTAs, such as the KORUS and TPP.79
IV. Other Precursors to TPP
The 2004 U.S. model BIT was designed in large part to incorporate the
2002 TPA investment negotiating objectives into the BIT process.so The
cryptic press release accurately states that "USTR and the State Department
consulted their respective advisory committees and relevant congressional
committees in the development of the new model." The debates over this
multilateral process, and the results insofar as investment and ISDS are
concerned, did not differ significantly from those relating to the 2002 TPA.
Even the "Bipartisan Trade Deal" (BTD) negotiated between the Bush
Administration and the Democratic Congress focused on the unhappiness of
Democratic Members with the Bush Administration's refusal to include in
its FTFAs a level of labor and environmental protection that Democrats
75. Letter from George Yeo, Singapore Minister for Trade and Industry, to Robert Zoellick,
U.S. Trade Representative (May 6, 2003) (on file with author).
76. Singapore FTA, supra note 74, art. 15.5; see also U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 70, art.
10.20.
77. Singapore FTA, rpra note 74, art. 15.19.4; see also U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 70, art.
10.19.4.
78. Singapore FTA, supra note 74, 15.15.1(a)(i); U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 70, art.
10.15(a)(1).
79. See KORUS, supra note 20, art. 11.6.1(a).
80. Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE (2004), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf
[hereinafter "2004 U.S. Model BIT"].
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believed was contemplated under 2002 TPA negotiating authority.s' The
only investment-related provision in the BTD stated that "[t]he preamble
provision [in the FTA] would recognize that foreign investors in the United
States will not be accorded greater substantive rights with respect to
investment protections than United States investors in the United States."82
As a result of these BTD mandated changes, which were incorporated into
amendments to the pending FTAs with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South
Korea, the FTA with Peru was promptly approved in November 2007 and
went into force the following year. The other three were not approved by
Congress until almost 2010 and entered into force in 2011. These FTAs,
however, contained investment provisions that differed in only minor
respects from the Australia/Chile/Singapore genre of FTAs.
The 2012 Model BIT,83 despite its three years in gestation and
resumption of the debate between pro and anti-ISDS contingents, made
only relatively minor changes to the 2004 .Model BIT.84 As the State
Department explained, "[t]he Administration made several important
changes to the BIT text so as to enhance transparency and public
participation; sharpen the disciplines that address preferential treatment to
state-owned enterprises, including the distortions created by certain
indigenous innovation policies; and strengthen protections relating to labor
and the environment."ss
V. 2015 Trade Promotion Authority
The debate over TPA during the first half of 2015 was perhaps the most
vituperative and public in history; because of the timing, the TPA opposition
has been difficult to separate from opposition to TPP, particularly where
investment issues and transparency have been at the forefront. This has
probably been due to several factors. These include: a) the widespread use
of the Internet and social media, which has facilitated the ease with which
critics can make their views widely known; b) the decision of Senator
Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, a former Harvard law
professor and liberal voice with many admirers, to assume the leadership of
the anti-trade, anti ISDS, anti-TPA, and anti-TPP forces among the public
81. Trade Facts: Bipartisan Trade Deal, UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 1, 1-4 (May
2007), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/assetupload-filel
2 7 _11319
.pdf; see also Sunghoon Cho, The Bush Administration and Democrats Reach a Bipartisan Deal on
Trade Policy, ASIL Insights (May 31, 2007), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/1
5 /
bush-administration-and-democrats-reach-bipartisan-deal-trade-policy (discussing various
aspects of the Bipartisan Trade Deal).
82. Trade Facts: Bipartisan Trade Deal, supra note 81, at 4.
83. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 80.
84. Id.
85. United States Concludes Review of Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/1
8 8 1 9 8.htm.
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and in the Senate;86 and c) the unfortunate decision of the Obama
Administration to wait until the beginning of 2014 before formally
requesting TPA from the Congress. These factors virtually guaranteed that
the TPA opponents would be able to join TPP opponents to present a
united front.87 The anti-TPA/anti-TPP/anti-trade agreement campaign
mounted by the labor unions and the supporters in Congress was more
effective (even though it ultimately failed) than at any time in the past in
initially blocking TPA, again in part because they had ample time to
organize their opposition, as well as because public concerns over the
negative effects of past FTAs on American workers, whether or not accurate,
were probably more pronounced in 2015 than at any time in the past.
Opponents of ISDS (and of TPA, TPP, and trade agreements more
generally) have had a new and highly articulate spokesperson in Senator
Warren, who has become "the national face of opposition to Mr. Obama on
the trade package."8 In an op-ed piece for the Washington Post, Senator
Warren attacked ISDS: "Agreeing to ISDS in this enormous new treaty
[TPP] would tilt the playing field in the United States further in favor of big
multinational corporations. Worse, it would undermine U.S. sovereignty."9
She denounced discrimination, whereby American labor unions seeking
action against Vietnamese violations of trade agreements would have to
make their case not in ISDS but only in Vietnamese courts.o The latter
assertion was a misrepresentation, innocent or otherwise. But the
underlying discrimination argument was valid. While the inclusion of labor
provisions in the TPP (and the TPA negotiating objectives) would subject
Vietnam to dispute settlement under the state-to-state provisions of the TPP
should Vietnam fail to enforce effectively its labor laws and the core ILO
labor standards,91 unlike investors who can bring disputes directly against
foreign government under the investment chapters, labor disputes can only
86. Along with Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio, a long-time opponent of international trade
agreements while serving in both the House and Senate. See Sen. Sherrod Brown, Fair Trade over
Free Trade, NPR Gan. 8, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=67401
61.
87. By the beginning of 2014, President Obama was sufficiently unpopular for a variety of
reasons. The Majority leader of the Senate, Harry Reid (D, Nevada) and the minority leader in
the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, successfully demanded that consideration of TPA
legislation be put off until after the November 2014 elections. See Eric Bradner & Manu Raju,
Harry Reid Rejects President Obama's Trade Push, POLIco (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.politico
.com/story/2014/01/harry-reid-barack-obama-trade-deals-102819.htnl.
88. Jennifer Steinhauer, From Senate Sideline, Elizabeth Warren is Face ofAttack on Trade Bill,
N.Y. TImEs (May 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/16/us/politics/elizabeth-war
ren-emerges-as-trade-bills-detractor-in-chief.htrul?_r=0.
89. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, WASH.
Posr (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lkill-the-dispute-settlement-
language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bdle-1 1e4-b274-e5209a3bc9
a9_story.html [hereinafter "Warren, TPP"]. Warren's statement was included essentially
verbatim in the CONGRESSIONAL REcoRD, Feb. 26, 2015, at S1144-1145.
90. Id.
91. Id.
[VOL. 50, NO. 2
EVOLUTION OF U.S. APPROACHES FROM NALFTA TO TPP 251
be brought where the labor advocates in the United States convince the U.S.
government to bring a case. Warren's attack on ISDS also mentioned the
controversial Vattenfall and Philip Morris ISDS proceedings, and complained
that "[g]iving foreign corporations special rights to challenge our laws
outside of our legal system would be a bad deal. If a final TPP agreement
includes Investor-State Dispute Settlement, the only winners will be
multinational corporations."92
The director of the President's National Economic Council, Jeffrey
Zients, noted that foreign courts do not always respect U.S. Constitutional
principles or act in an unbiased or non-discriminatory manner, emphasizing
that "over the last 50 years, 180 countries have entered into more than 3,000
agreements that provide investment protections."93 Moreover, he stressed
that "TPP will make it absolutely clear that governments can regulate in the
public interest, including with regard to health, safety and the environment,
and narrowing the definition of what kinds of injuries investors can seek
compensation for."- He did not address the question of discrimination in
terms of standing between labor interests and private investors. Given
Warren's well-articulated opposition to Wall Street and business interests in
general, like many other Democrats, she ultimately sees BITs and FTA
investment provisions as making it easier for U.S. enterprises to move jobs
abroad.95 Others, such as Gary Hufbauer, were less diplomatic, simply
accusing Warren of relying on false information: "[Warren's] claims, and
some other criticisms of the TPP, have no foundation in the long history of
ISDS provisions that have been in existence for more than 50 years."96
Despite the energetic and very public debate in the second quarter of
2015, viewpoints do not seem to have changed, at least among a large
majority of Senators and Members of Congress. The TPA bill, after the
acceptance of several amendments (none related to investment), and a
Byzantine six weeks of procedural skirmishes, was passed by the Senate the
first time on May 22, 2015 (62-37) and again on June 24 (60-38),97 with
92. Warren, supra note 89.
93. Jeffrey Zients, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDI) Questions and Answers, WHrFE
HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/26/investor-state-
dispute-settlement-isds-questions-and-answers.
94. Id.
95. See e.g., CONG REc. S1,142 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2015) (statement of Sen. Brown) ("Just look
at the impact of trade on U.S. manufacturing jobs. . . . Ever since NAFTA in 1993, taking effect
in 1994, we have seen the acceleration of that decline in manufacturing jobs.").
96. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Senator Warren Distorts the Record on Investor-State Dispute
Settlements, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL EcoNowmcs (Mar. 2, 2015), https://
piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/senator-warren-distorts-record-investor-state-
dispute.
97. H.R. 1314, 114th Cong., (2015) (enacted) available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/house-bilhl/314 (last visited May 27, 2015) Ensuring Tax Exempt Organizations
the Right to Appeal Act: The first vote, May 22, combined TPP and TPA. Because revenue bills
must originate in the House of Representatives (U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 7, clause 1: "All Bills
for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose
or concur with Amendments as on other Bills"), the Senate co-opted an earlier House bill and
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strong cooperation among President Obama, a dozen pro-trade Democrats
and the Republican leadership in the Senate. It passed the House as a stand-
alone bill (after Trade Adjustment Assistance for displaced workers had
earlier been caused to fail by the Democratic leadership in the hope that it
would kill the TPA as well) by a vote 218-210, with a majority of the
Republicans in support but only about a twenty-eight Democrats voting in
favor of their President's most important second term legislative initiative.98
Ultimately, President Obama signed the TPA legislation on June 29, 2015,99
after the House had relented and provided broad bipartisan support to a
separate TAA bill that was signed as well.oo
None of this debate changed the content of TPA negotiating objectives in
major respects as they relate to ISDS and related investment issues. The
treatment of key areas such as fair and equitable treatment; expropriation;
transparency; procedures to eliminate frivolous claims; endorsement of an
appellate body, as well as the continuing overarching desire to limit foreign
investor rights in the United States to those enjoyed by U.S. citizens, all
differ significantly from NAFTA. But the actual negotiating objectives
language in this newest version of TPA reflects only relatively minor
innovations beyond the extensive shifts reflected in the 2002 TPA and in the
U.S. FTAs with Chile, Australia, and Singapore, along with the single
modification required in the Bipartisan Trade Deal of 2007, all as discussed
earlier in this article.
VI. TPP's Investment Provisions
This enactment of TPA gave the Obama Administration, at long last, the
authority it needed to conclude the TPP, without the need for any major
changes, at least in the investment area. Ironically, the last issues to be
resolved in TPP were largely unrelated to ISDS (dairy market access in
Canada; rice, beef, and auto market access in Japan; sugar market access in
the United States and Mexico; Canada's insistence on higher regional value
substituted TPA for the original language. The second bill, having been received from the
House with only the TPA language, was designated H.R. 2146. See U.S. SENATE ROLL CALL
VoTEs 114TH CONGRESS - 1ST SESSION (June 24, 2015) available at http://insidetrade.com/
sites/insidetrade.com/files/documents/jun2l5/wto2015_2018a.pdf (last visited June 25, 2015).
98. Cristina Marcos & Vicki Needham, House approves fast-track 218-208, sending bill to Senate,
THE HILL (une 18, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/245417-house-
approves-fast-track-2 18-208-sending-bill-to-senate.
99. See Cheryl Bolen, Obama Signs Trade Bills Needed to Negotiate Trans-Pacific Partnership,
INT'L TRADE DAIY (BNA) (June 29, 2016) (reporting the signature of the "Defending Public
Safety Employees' Retirement Act (H.R. 2146)" to which the TPA was attached and the Trade
Preference Adjustment Act which provides an extension of TAA).
100. The TAA bill passed the House the second time as a separate bill by a vote of 286-138,
with strong backing this time from the Democrats. House Approves TAA-Preferences Bill 286-
138, with Strong Democratic Support, WORLD TRADE ONLn-7E (June 25, 2015) (H.R. 1295
renews TAA for six years, the African Growth and Opportunity Act for ten years, and the
Generalized System of Preferences until the end of 2017; the first two of these have received
strong support from Democrats in the past).
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content for autos and small trucks to protect their auto and auto parts
industries' preferred access to the U.S. and Canadian markets; and U.S.
efforts to expand patent protection for biologic drugs.)o1O With the
negotiations completed and the text public, the bitter debate among the
Administration, most Republicans in Congress, and business interests on one
hand and most Democrats, organized labor, and various NGOs on the
otherl02 as predicted has resumed.103 Even with the signing of TPP on
February 4, 2016, its ultimate fate was unclear given the ongoing
disagreements discussed earlier and the vagaries of the 2016 Presidential
election. Thus, TPP as a practical matter could not have been transmitted
to Congress at the earliest until after the November 2016 elections.-o4
Because the Congress did not act on TPP in the "lame duck" session,105
approval (or rejection) of the Agreement awaits a new Congress and a
President Trump in 2017, and could be delayed for months or years, or even
abandoned entirely.
A series of exceptions to national treatment and non-discrimination
remains in TPP, as in previous FTAs. In addition, there are a number of
important innovations beyond even the most recent U.S. FTA investment
chapters and the 2015 TPA. As one expert observed:
TPP's chapter on Investment strengthens the rule of law in the Asia-
Pacific region, deters foreign governments from imposing
discriminatory or abusive requirements on American investors, and
protects the right to regulate in the, and building on U.S. experience
since NAFTA, the innovations take investment agreements to a new
level in terms of protecting host state discretion in such areas as
guarding the government's regulatory discretion in such areas as public
health and the environment.106
101. See In Hill Briefing, USTR Official Signals TPP Ministerial Unlikely in August, WORLD
TRADE ONLE (Aug. 7, 2015), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/hill-briefing-ustr-official-
signals-tpp-ministerial-unlikely-august?utm source=dlvr.it&utm medium=twitter.
102. The divisions are less along party lines than at most times in the past, with the leading
candidate for the Republican presidential nomination on record as opining that "TPP is a
horrible deal . . . ." See Donald Trump on Free Trade, ON THE IssuEs, available at http://www
.ontheissues.org/2016/DonaldTrumpFreeTrade.htn (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
103. See Carter Dougherty & Angela Greiling Keane, Obama Victory on Trade Wins Him Another
Fight With Fellow Democrats, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (June 26, 2015).
104. See Len Bracken, TPP Supporters Seek May-July Consideration of Trade Pact, INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) (Jan. 14, 2016) (noting that while some supporters are hoping for earlier
consideration others believe consideration is not likely before the post-election lame duck
session).
105. Trade Deals Working For All Americans, WmTE HouSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
trade-deals-working-all-americans (last visited Jan. 22, 2017) (stating President Trump's official
opposition to TPP).
106. Investment - The Trans-Pacific Partnership, MEDIUM, https://medium.com/the-trans-
pacific-partnership/investment-c76dbd892f3a#.ntO4qy4sd (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
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Chapter 9 generally includes extensive language that is broadly similar to
that of earlier U.S. FTAs (such as Singapore and CAFTA-DR) providing for
preliminary consideration of procedural issues,107 and for transparency in
respect to arbitral pleadings and open hearings.108 (This result is reinforced
by the fact that at least two of the TPP parties have signed the U.N.
Transparency Convention, an extension of the UNCITRAL Transparency
Rules adopted in 2014.)109 TPP tribunals would retain the authority to
"accept and consider" amicus curtiae submissions, but with the caveat that the
submission must be "regarding a matter of fact or law within the scope of the
dispute that may assist the tribunal in evaluating the submissions and
arguments of the disputing parties . . . ."1o
The language found in U.S. ETA investment chapters since Australia,
Chile, and Singapore defining "customary international law" as resulting
from "a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a
sense of legal obligation" remains in place,"' as does the now-traditional
expropriation annex, including with minor changes in word order the key
"[njon-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations,
except in rare circumstances."12 Also, the incorporation of the standard
language defining "fair and equitable treatment" as including "[t]he
obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the
principal legal systems of the world . . . ." remains.11s
Still, the fact that this is a further swing of the pendulum is reflected in the
Preamble to the TPP, where the Parties recognize:
their inherent right to regulate and resolve to preserve the flexibility of
the Parties to set legislative and regulatory priorities, safeguard public
welfare and protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public
health, safety, the environment, the conservation of living or non-living
exhaustible natural resources, the integrity and stability of the financial
system and public morals .... 114
107. TPP Text, supra note 16, at art. 9.22.4.
108. Id. at art. 9.23.
109. U.N. Convention on Transparemy in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Mar. 17, 2015),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/
Transparency-Convention-e.pdf, Esme Shirlow, A Step Toward Greater Transparency: The UN
Transparency Convention, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 30, 2015), http://kluwerarbitra
tionblog.com/blog/2015/03/30/a-step-toward-greater-transparency-the-un-transparency-con
vention/.
110. TPP Text, supra note 16, at art. 9.22.3
111. TPP Text, supra note 16, at Annex 9-A, see AUSFTA, supra note 14, at Annex 11-A; see
U.S.-Chile FTA, at Annex 10-A.
112. TPP Text, supra note 16, at Annex 9-B 1 3(b); see AUSFTA, supra note 14, at Annex 11-B
T 4(b).
113. TPP Text, supra note 16, at art. 9.6.2(a); AUSFTA, supra note 14, at art. 11.5.2(a).
114. TPP Text, supra note 16, at Preamble, 1 9.
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Other notable changes (some buried in footnotes) include:
1. The "in like circumstances" requirement in the national treatment
article is made somewhat more difficult for investors to satisfy,
requiring the determination to depend "on the totality of the
circumstances, including whether the relevant treatment distinguishes
between investors or investments on the basis of legitimate public
welfare objectives."115
2. Limiting the scope of investors' "reasonable expectations" as a basis
for a finding of a denial of fair and equitable treatment by providing
that "the mere fact that a Party takes or fails to take an action that may
be inconsistent with an investor's expectations does not constitute a
breach of this Article [9.6], even if there is loss or damage to the covered
investment as a result."16 This may be significant given that tribunals
often give weight to an investor's "legitimate expectations" when
finding a denial of fair and equitable treatment.117 Similarly, the failure
of the host government to issue, renew or maintain a subsidy, or to
reduce a subsidy, is not a breach of fair and equitable treatment.118
3. Where the arbitration concerns an alleged breach of a Party's
obligation in an attempt to make an investment (pre-investment
violations, which are covered), "the only damages that may be awarded
are those that the claimant has proven were sustained in the attempt to
make the investment . . . ."119 This change also could be important
where a dispute arises over the state's pre-investment conduct, as in
Bicon v. Canada.120
4. Where the claimant submits a claim based on an investment
authorization or investment agreement, the "respondent may make a
counterclaim in connection with the factual or legal basis of the claim
or rely on a claim for the purpose of a set off against the claimant."21
This is the first agreement where to the author's knowledge
counterclaims have been explicitly permitted.
5. The chapter makes explicit what has been implicit (and universally
observed) in the past; the "investor has the burden of proving all
elements of its claims . ."122
115. Id. at art. 9.4, n.14.
116. Id. at art. 9.6.4.
117. See GARY B. BoRN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 430 (The
Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2012).
118. TPP Text, supra note 16, at art. 9.6.5.
119. Id. at art. 9.29.2-4.
120. See Bikon v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability [Permanent Court of Arbitration]
(Mar. 17, 2015), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commer
ciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/clayton-12.pdf (Can.); See also Bikon v. Canada, available at http://
www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/clayton-
13.pdf (Prof. McCrae, dissenting) (Can.).
121. TPP Text, supra note 16, art. 9.19.1-2.
122. Id. art. 9.23.7.
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6. While there is no explicit code of conduct for arbitrators in the
chapter, the Parties have effectively agreed to apply the code of conduct
for panelists in state-to-state dispute settlement proceedings to ISD
arbitration, with "any necessary modifications to the Code of Conduct
to conform to the context of the investor-state dispute settlement."123
Many will see this as long overdue.
7. Certain tobacco control opt-outs are provided, permitting any
Party "to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) with
respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party."
That election can be made up to and including the period when
arbitration proceedings are underway,124 and has already been
provisionally exercised by Australia.125
8. The TPP goes beyond some but not all U.S. investment chapters in
extending coverage explicitly to state enterprises, to measures adopted
or maintained by "any person, including a state enterprise or any other
body, when it exercises any governmental authority delegated to it by
central, regional or local governments or authorities of that Party."126
This language is important in part because of the existence of a separate
TPP chapter purporting to regulate the activities of the Parties' state-
owned enterprises.127
9. While investment agreements and investment authorizations are
generally within the coverage of the chapter, violations of an
"investment authorization" explicitly do not include:
(i) actions taken by a Party to enforce laws of general application,
such as competition, environmental, health or other regulatory
laws; (ii) non-discriminatory licensing regimes; and (iii) a Party's
decision to grant to a covered investment or an investor of another
Party a particular investment incentive or other benefit, that is not
provided by a foreign investment authority in an investment
authorisation.128
10. Tribunals are encouraged to decide as a preliminary matter not
only situations where a claim is not one for which an award under the
chapter can be granted, but explicitly an "objection that a dispute is not
within the competence of the tribunal . . ."129 In both situations the
tribunal is also encouraged in "frivolous" cases to award attorneys' fees
123. Id. art. 9.22.6.
124. Id. at art. 29.5.
125. Notification by Austl., Feb. 2016 (Pursuant to Article 29.5 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP) signed in Auckland, New Zealand on 4 February 2016, Australia hereby
elects to deny the benefits of Section B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) of Chapter 9
(Investment) of the TPP with respect to any claim in relation to its tobacco control measures.
Accordingly, no claim can be submitted to arbitration under the TPP's investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism in respect of any tobacco control measure of Australia.).
126. TPP Text, supra note 16, at art. 9.2.2(b).
127. Id. at ch. 17.
128. Id. at art. 9.1, n.10.
129. Id. at art. 9.23.4.
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to the respondent.130 These are modest expansions to similar provisions
found in other recent agreements, such as the KORUS.131 The extent
to which tribunals will heed such entreaties may vary from tribunal to
tribunal.
11. If either disputing party (investor or host government) requests,
the tribunal is required to provide its proposed award on liability to the
disputing parties for comment within a sixty day period. The tribunal
must then "consider any comments" but is not bound by them.132 This
is similar to the "initial report" procedures found in both TPP and
NAFTA,1I33 but nothing similar exists in NAFTA, Chapter 11.134 This
right of comment could provide the disputing parties, particularly the
host government, an additional opportunity to sway (or pressure) the
tribunal with regard to the tribunal's proposed results and reasoning,
with only a modest delay in the proceedings.
The only obvious retreat in the TPP investment chapter relates to an
appellate mechanism for investment disputes. U.S. TPA negotiating
objectives since 2002 provided for consideration of an appellate mechanism
for investment disputes, and such language has been included in all post-
NAFTA FTAs, as in KORUS.s35 (There is no publicly available evidence
that any such negotiations have ever occurred.) The TPP language provides
only that "[iun the event that an appellate mechanism for reviewing awards
rendered by investor-State dispute settlement tribunals is developed in the
future under other institutional arrangements, the Parties shall consider
whether awards rendered under Article 9.28 (Awards) should be subject to
that appellate mechanism."136 This presumably reflects USTR Ambassador
Froman's belief that an appellate body for investment disputes is
unnecessary.'37 Unless by some chance the TTIP Parties agree on an
appellate mechanism,138 it is highly unlikely that such a tribunal with
significant membership will be developed elsewhere, since amendment of
130. Id. at art. 9.29.4.
131. KORUS, supra note 20, at arts. 11.20.6-8.
132. TPP Text, supra note 16, at art. 9.23.10.
133. Id. at art. 28.17; NAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 2016.
134. See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1135 (providing only for a final award).
135. KORUS, supra note 20, at Annex 11-D.
136. TPP Text, supra note 16, at art. 9.23.11 (emphasis added).
137. See Michael Scaturro, TTIP Talks Slow on EU's Investor Court System, INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), Feb. 25, 2016 (reporting that "U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, for his part
has said he does not think the use of an appellate body is necessary" in discussions with the EU
Commission).
138. See Commission draft text TTIP- Investment, art. 10 (Nov. 2015), available at http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/201 5/september/tradoc_153807.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2016)
(the EU Commission proposal for the TTIP Parties to agree on an appellate mechanism).
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the ICSID Convention to' provide for such mechanism is politically and
practical impossible139
The extent to which these innovations will make a significant difference in
the results of investment arbitrations depends on their use in actual disputes,
which is not likely to occur soon given that the TPP will almost surely not
enter into force for several years. This makes the significance of this more
host country friendly approach to ISDS even more difficult to predict.
VII. Conclusions
Should the TPP ultimately go into force for many if not all of the TPP
Parties, it will establish a more host state friendly standard for ISDS,
affording governments a new and higher level of regulatory flexibility. The
practical significance of these changes will probably not be evident for at
least several years after the TPP enters into force. Some of the changes
would have an obvious impact on future ISDS-for example, Phillip Morris
could not bring an action under TPP, Chapter 9 against Australia or any
other Party that resorts to plain-packaging rules for cigarettes (perhaps
Canada).- In specific cases, the other changes listed above could also
become significant. Even if the United States never becomes Party to the
TPP the TPP investment provisions are likely to be reflected in other U.S.
FTA negotiations, such as the renegotiation of NAFTA likely to begin by
mid-2017.141
This assumes of course that the TPP Parties who have other FTAs with
investment chapters indicate clearly and unequivocally that TPP, Chapter 9
supersedes earlier investment provisions that may be friendlier to foreign
investors and less protective of host state regulatory flexibility, such as
Chapter 11 of NAFTA. The need for such indications is made necessary by
the language in TPP that indicates that as a general rule TPP provisions
should "coexist" with the WTO Agreements and the many free trade
agreements to which one or more of the TPP Parties are also parties.142
With NAFTA, the prospect of Chapter 11 "coexisting" with TPP, Chapter 9
should be of considerable concern to the NAFTA Parties, since all NAFTA
139. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations
and Rules (April 10, 2006), available at http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/StaticFiles/
basicdoc/main-eng.htm.
140. See Daniel Hurst, Australia Wins International Legal Battle with Philip Morris over Plain
Packaging, THE GuARDIN (Dec. 17, 2015, 9:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2015/dec/18/australia-wins-international-legal-battle-with-philip-morris-over-plain-
packaging.
141. See Patrick Gillespie, Trump Wants to 'Speed' Up NAFTA talks, Calls Deal a 'Catastrophe,
CNN MoNEY (Feb. 2, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/02/news/economy/mexico-nafta-
negotiations-90-days/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (reporting that both Mexico and the United
States had indicated that negotiations could begin after a ninety-day period for Mexican
consultation with its stakeholders and the Trump administration with Congress under Trade
Promotion Authority legislation).
142. TPP Text, supra note 16, at art. 1.2.1.
[VOL. 50, NO. 2
2017] EVOLUTION OF U.S. APPROACHES FROM NAFTA TO TPP 259
governments have assured their constituents that TPP provides them with a
much higher level of regulatory flexibility than NAFTA Chapter 11.
Regardless of these concerns, the TPP investment provisions are the
latest, although undoubtedly not the final, step in the evolution of the
balance between investor protection and host state preservation of a higher
level of regulatory flexibility.

